Abstract: Western scientific communities have, for the past few decades, been overly concerned with ensuring that social - including educational - research is conducted to the highest ‘ethical’ standard (Hammersley, 2010). The exact meaning of the word remains contested, as does the question of whether insisting too much upon ethical rules and regulations perhaps harms the quality and freedom of the scientific endeavour. In this article, I reflect on the main arguments in this on-going debate, with the particular accent on ethics and power relationships in elite research, often neglected in such discussions. I conclude by noting that, whatever one’s stance, what is necessary, to advance both the debate and the quality of one’s research, is a greater concern with the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of adopted positions.

Key words: ethics, reflexivity, elite interviews, power.

Introduction

Prior to my commencing the interview-based fieldwork within my PhD project centred on the development of a Serbian education policy, my intended methodology was to receive clearance from the University’s Ethics Committee. Once in the field, I had to offer my respondents an ‘informed consent’ form, approved by said Committee, for them to sign and thus vouchsafe that they are voluntarily agreeing to participate in my research, and that they are aware of their various rights, such as the right to anonymity, confidentiality, or the abandonment of the project together with data we have produced. Some of the informants were intrigued and wished to know more about procedures for ensuring the ethical character of research at our university. Others signed without so much as skimming the document, safe in the belief that they shall be treated fairly, and that the
form was mere bureaucratic nuisance to get out of the way. Some, still, sceptically raised the issue of the apparent artifice of insisting upon ethics of social research whilst neglecting ethics of conduct in other areas, such as public policy, or foreign affairs.

I, for my part, wondered about what was really guaranteed with these forms, and why they did not seem to resolve any of the numerous ethical issues - of (dis)honesty, allegiance, worthiness, usefulness and purpose, to name a few - that I have personally been experiencing at various points throughout the course of my project. It became impossible not to reflect on Hammersley’s (2010) recent observation that these procedures have likely been put in place not to help solve such complex issues, but to make it easier to locate the blame in event of something going wrong. This, he claims, is indicative of an ideology of accountability, in large - or globalising - societies, in which it is safer to reach for bureaucratic mechanisms, than it is to trust the people’s (researchers’) sensible and professional judgement.

This is just one of the positions on the matter which I will discuss here, drawing on my own experience as an emerging social researcher as much as on the current academic debates. It is necessary to qualify my focusing on ethical issues encountered particularly with qualitative methods, by noting that I am writing from the perspective of my own epistemology, which is one of critical realism married with discourse theory (see for example Fairclough, 2006). Although some of the ethical issues I touch upon are universal, and can be encountered in quantitative methodology as well as qualitative, most of them are more common in the latter, with its, as Punch (2005) notes, arguably greater intrusion into people’s private lives and intimate thoughts.

The development of ethical regulations and common ethical issues they tackle

Some authors date the increased awareness and preoccupation with research ethics as far back as Nuremberg Trials and the atrocities committed in the WW2 in the name of science (Dingwall, 2008). In discussing the extension of various ethical norms to social science, Milgram’s study of obedience and Humphrey’s covert observations of the ‘tearoom trade’, both conducted in the 1960s, have become the unavoidable textbook examples of ‘unethical’ scientific behaviour. However, despite the fact that a social science project nowadays does not usually carry such a risk to the participants’ wellbeing as these famous cases, the Western research community has gone through great lengths to establish various ethical regula-
tions and appropriate ethical boards to ensure that these regulations are being adhered to. Unfortunately, receiving an ethics committee’s stamp of approval does not solve most of the problems routinely faced by researchers throughout their project, and, as various authors point out, aiming to tick those boxes and satisfy those criteria can actually hamper the access to valuable data and the production of valuable knowledge (Hammersley, 2008; 2010; Dingwall, 2008; Hammersley and Traianou, 2011).

The most common ethical issues considered in social science research are those of anonymity and confidentiality of the data, cost/benefit and reciprocity for both the researcher and the researched, deception or making sure that participants are giving their ‘informed’ consent to being studied, the researcher’s allegiance and loyalty to multiple groups (participants, general public, research community, sponsor if there is one), and various conflicts of interest that arise when these do not coincide - which they almost never do. There are a number of problems that can occur with regards to any of them - during the course of research, for example, some information might be revealed which the researcher feels should be made public, thus breaching the anonymity/confidentiality rule. Then there is the relationship of reciprocity between the scientists and their subjects, closely tied with the balance of power between them, which is an ideal to work towards, rather than an achievable state, and is something which is rarely made explicit and actively incorporated in data collection and analysis. ‘Informed consent’ is a debatable term at best, especially when dealing with vulnerable groups, or when a concern for richer and more useful data results in a conscious withholding of information about the full extent of the research. In addition, there are situations when it would be nigh on impossible to obtain informed consent in the first place - for example when observing social behaviour in a public place, or when studying content available through social networks and internet forum boards. Finally, there are various political issues implicit in ownership of data, and the publication and use of research findings (Dingwall, 2008).

The most commonly raised issue is the treatment of data in terms of its anonymity and confidentiality, and the default position here is for the data to be kept anonymous – in fact, this is usually supposed to be guaranteed by the informed consent forms. Most research handbooks stress these rights to anonymity and confidentiality as a given, and something to be adhered to at all costs. However, not only do researchers rarely discuss the difficulties that can often arise from the attempt to keep anonymity and confidentiality at all times, they almost never scratch the surface of the problematic implications of keeping them as the default in social science research. This is a case of balancing responsibility to the participants with the responsibility to the public, and Baez (2002), in the vein
of the critical theorist, points to the ethical dilemma that can arise from keeping data obtained through research a secret, when it can expose some social wrong and assist emancipation. He further argues that the sanctity of anonymity and confidentiality is based upon a liberal humanist ideology, which raises the rights of an individual above the rights of the society and the common good, an imbalance that should be redressed, if not by radically abstaining from anonymising data, then at least through offering our respondents the option.

Walford (2005) is also among authors who stress the absurdity of pretending to adhere to these principles, especially in today’s internet age, where information is always readily available, and especially when applied to research in small groups where they will inevitably be able to make connections and recognise each other. And, as de Laine (2000) concludes, even if someone’s anonymity is guarded, there is a great chance that the respondents will recognise themselves, and however they are portrayed, feel somewhat exploited. Walford (2005) speculates that the potential reason behind insisting upon these principles by default is in ensuring access, or perhaps even allowing for spurious generalisations to take place, for if conclusions are based on a nameless sample, they can apply to everyman.

As Spicker (2007) points out, in researching policy, the contestation between public and private is even higher, and if we are to assume that in a democracy everything is open to public scrutiny, then so are the actions of the policy-making elites. However, viewing it in this light implies a level of normative judgement and the imagined purpose of one’s research, which I do not necessarily share. On a more personal level, however, it is easy to imagine that these elites are public figures used to – or expecting to – having their opinion publicised, and in my experience, the default expectation among informants was, precisely, that their words will be attributed to them, with only certain statements precluded with ‘but this is anonymous’. And even without widening the context and referring to the public identity of the participants, as in the case of elites, there will be instances of their simply wishing to maintain ownership of their words and their identity, by not becoming rendered nameless and faceless by the researcher. Grinyer (2002), for example, paints a rather vivid picture of one such case in which a default, anonymising option was applied to accounts of terminal cancer patients, most of whom had died by the publication of the study, which is when their families realised that a lot of that extremely intimate and harrowing experience related in the study, had been taken away by their being given pseudonyms.

Perhaps a way to resolve such issues would be to provide the participants with as much information about how data will be used and presented, and what the purpose of the study is. This however, leads to another highly contested ethi-
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cal issue, that of ‘informed consent’. This problem is one that presents itself in both qualitative and quantitative methodology, the problem of, Silverman (2000) notes, how much to reveal about research to our participants, so that we feel they are giving their ‘informed’ consent, but without ‘contaminating’ the data. In a somewhat utilitarian fashion, Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) stress that when asking this question, and making the decision, it is important to bear in mind the end purpose of the choice we are making.

All of the above issues are tackled by resorting to either deontological or consequential ethics (Spicker, 2007), the former implying some sort of universal ethical standards to be adhered to whenever possible, whilst the latter involves varying degrees of what could be best described as situational relativism. Here, the logic that is followed is based on the case-to-case personal judgement of the researcher(s), but is usually, or at least should be, closely related to their epistemological position, and the purpose that they imagine their research to have.

This last point dictates a rather straightforward procedure for the critical theorists, for as the emancipation and empowerment of the ‘oppressed’ are the ultimate purpose of their work, then most ethical dilemmas are resolved by simply keeping this interest as the most dominant. To the critical theorists, any sort of scientific detachment is seen as ‘dishonest’ (Lather, 2010). However, what overtly political scientists often do not acknowledge, is the relationship of power between them and those they consider unaware of their position and in need of liberating and pointing in the right way, which critical theorists often assume they hold the key to. Lather (2010) is among critical authors who demand political activism for research that is hardly ever value free. However, acknowledging and incorporating personal values in the development of the question, methodology, fieldwork and analysis, is not the same as accepting a partisan role for oneself, and it is fair to acknowledge the two as separate. Furthermore, not everything can necessarily be explained away by employing the categories of race, class, or gender, and to do so, in fact, would be to commit an act of symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 1991) upon the subjects of research, whom the critical theorists (often unwittingly, it seems) condescendingly describe as ‘mystified by ideology’ (Lather, 2010: 193).

Contrary to the critical researchers’ engaged approached and advocacy of the intrinsic altruistic value of research, authors like Hammersley (2008) argue for a scientific inquiry that does not have a purpose beyond the production of knowledge. The fact that education is considered one of the applied social sciences does not pose a problem for his viewpoint. Hammersley does not argue that the subsequent instrumentalism applied to this knowledge is impossible or even completely inappropriate, but he does demand that whilst it is being conducted, the ultimate purpose of research should be ‘knowledge for knowledge’s
sake’. Furthermore, this purpose is important enough for him to suggest a form of Machiavellianism in conducting research, i.e. acknowledging the employment of ‘less than good means to achieve good ends’, and temporarily suspending not only what could be considered universal, but also personal ethical norms and values, in producing valuable knowledge (Hammersley and Traianou, 2011).

Hammersley’s seemingly detached scientific approach clashes with the more emotive, feminist approaches, or even Hatch’s (2002) usually value-free observation about the relationship of trust and bonding that develops between the researcher and the researched, one which is difficult to end without the guilt of having taken advantage and abandoned the subjects. In a way, however, Hammersley’s Machiavellian reasoning can be utilised as a way of coping with such sentiments, where the researcher finds that both the conceptual design of their work and their personal disposition create concerns which would require coping in the first place.

The exploitation and benefit - the relationships of power

In his very practical handbook aimed at educational researchers, Hatch (2002) shows the greatest ethics-related concern for the issues of reciprocity between the researcher and the researched. He seems to take for granted the researcher’s gain in this relationship, and never questions the potential risk and harm to this party. Instead, he simply asks how the balance could be restored in ensuring that the participants, too, benefit from this relationship. Any such arrangement in which participation would be rewarded in some material way opens up another set of ethical concerns, however, which he never really attempts to explore.

Some authors argue that the increased ‘democratisation’ of the research process, especially post data collection point, might be a way to counter some of the impressions of participants’ being ‘taken advantage of’. For example, Walford (2005) argues for a continuous toing and froing between the researcher and the respondent, where respondent validation of the researcher’s treatment of the data becomes an integral part of the data analysis process, rather than a one-off incident serving to confirm the researcher’s conclusions. Hammersley and Atkinson (2007), on the other hand, believe respondent validation to be a contentious point, as it can ‘corrupt data’. Some authors go even further and claim that there is little reason to believe that respondents should have a privileged status when it comes to commenting and analysing their actions (Silverman, 2000). Personally, I agree with Scott and Usher (1999) who point out that research which gives a highly important place to the rights and responsibilities of participants, is idealis-
tic and rarely practicable, and that most research assumes more of an ‘autocratic’ approach. Such concern with the participants view of analysis can lead to highly uncomfortable, and not very productive, situations, such as one experienced by a feminist researcher, who having sent a draft of her completed study to one of her respondents, received a less than happy reaction, as the respondent fiercely and emotionally objected to being portrayed (not personally, but as a category in the review of the literature) in a highly unfavourable light. And I believe that ‘unfavourable’ to some degree is how a lot of respondents would judge our portrayal of them. With the exception of very personal and empathetic approaches and portrayals, the very abstraction of someone’s personal experience to a theory or a concept, inevitably carries with it a degree of objectification and depersonification, with which most participants could find it difficult to agree.

There is another point in the researcher-researched relationship that is important to raise here. Most authors who stress issues of emotional and psychological harm implicit in the assumption of ‘exploitation’, fail to extend their speculation to the various reasons for which the respondents agree to partake in (especially qualitative) research, the simplest and most common of which would be the desire to have their voices and stories heard, and pleasure taken in the fact that someone considers them worthy of research (Agar, 2008). Barring some exceptional situations where respondents are young children or the disabled, with most qualitative research, the above relationship is one of mutual and reciprocal instrumentalism, inherent in most adult relationships.

Arksey and Knight (1999) observe that there are various benefits that the participants might gain from the research situation, which can have, if not exactly transformative, then reflective, enlightening, or even a cathartic character. Even if I do not entirely subscribe to such collaborative and feminist techniques as promoted for example by Kezar (2003) in her reflection on transformative interviews, including with elites, I have certainly experienced numerous instances of my respondents’ thinking about a certain issue for perhaps the first time, or viewing it in a different light, and commenting on and analysing their actions and values as the interview progressed.

So not only are there decidedly beneficial factors - for participants - in research, it is also important to note the harm and risk to the researcher, in an ethnographic or an interview-based study, often neglected in discussions about power and exploitation. Sometimes it will be precisely the researcher who is exploited, and possibilities for this range from the interviewee’s hijacking the interview for their purposes, to extorting actual material benefit. The researcher may also in some way be harmed through emotionally draining research, or by
the inappropriate and offensive behaviour of the participants, which needs to be tolerated for research purposes (Arksey and Knight, 1999).

This is not to say that mere reciprocity makes this relationship one of equality. It can still be characterised by the power imbalance, and it is precisely this imbalance that will raise the most serious ethical concerns, concerns that cannot be easily dispelled with forms and regulations. However, it is important to stress that how this is dealt with should, apart from personal and professional values, also rest on the back of how power is conceptualised and theorised. In my own research, for example, I accept the fluidity of power that comes from various positioning within a discourse (Cambridge, 2007), and the flexibility of the power balance. I also accept that this runs throughout the whole research process, starting with the definition of the question, and the research design, all the way to the publication process, but is perhaps most immediately and personally felt during fieldwork itself, especially if this involves an interview situation. In educational policy research in particular, Ozga (2011) urges for the power positions, relationships and agendas of elite interviewing to be actively considered.

**Power and exploitation in elite interviewing**

Policy studies normally involve interviews with past or present policy-makers, curriculum developers, and various respondents who are usually recognised as ‘high-standing’, so interviewing them is referred to as interviewing *up* (Conti and O’Neill, 2007). I disagree with such a view, which somehow implies a fixed, almost structuralist (Smith, 2006) balance of power in my respondents’ favour. The same notion, only in the opposite direction, would then also apply to non-elite interviews, with respondents usually thought of as having ‘less’ power than the researcher. Not only that, it also implies that the ‘elite’ attribute assumes the static nature of power and its transferability from one context (educational decision-making) to another (social science research) (*ibid.*). In reality, with ‘elite’ as well as with ‘non-elite’ respondents, a number of factors beginning with the negotiation of access, through the immediate context of the interview, to its conduct, will affect the change in power and discourse that is produced. Some of these will be performed unconsciously on either side, but a lot of them will be a result of the conscious use of our cultural and symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1991).

Costa and Kiss (2011) offer examples of uncomfortable situations which arose from asymmetrical power relations, which are, they claim, a consequence of historical, cultural, and institutional context, but are, however, changeable over the course of the interview, and are subject to management through good
preparation and strong social skills. In addition to the reasons they have stated, I believe that some of these uncomfortable situations, and it is certainly the impression I got from some of my interviews, are a consequence of a very conscious employment of the cultural or symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1991), or control over discourse, which creates unequal power relationships. The practical issues surrounding the arrangement of an interview can also fall under this. For example, during about a half of my interviews, I felt the swaying of the power balance in relation to various situations of last-minute cancellations, last-minute accepting, arriving to an empty office since due to my respondent’s last-minute trip abroad and their having forgotten to let me know about it, and even one instance of ‘ambushing’ a respondent at their place of work after their lack of response to my countless emails and phone messages, and improvising a quick interview on the spot. In fact, I think that even the more technical issues, such as the oft-warned about malfunction of the recording device (which I unfortunately experienced on one occasion) may affect the management of the flow of power during an interview, as they can signal to the respondent the lack of proper preparation or even a lack of a serious, professional approach to the situation.

Self-presentation, considered in the manner of being used for power balance management, may also constitute an ethical concern, as it almost inevitably involves an element of dishonesty and managing others’ reactions and relationships to oneself. However, this concern can be somewhat assuaged by remembering that respondents, too, have their own expectations and will perform constructions of us based on their experience, so our own agency in this is limited by the act of co-constitution of the researcher-researched relationship. Ultimately, it is all largely to do with the flexible employment of our (and our respondents’) many roles and identities (de Laine, 2000). In my experience, this was adapted to the respondent and the immediate context. On occasion, I would engage the persona of a ‘researcher’ or a ‘scientist’, when I felt the matter being discussed was somewhat controversial for the respondent, and I thus sought to reassure them that I was approaching these matters from a detached, scientific point of view, rather than that of a journalist researching a story. My personal political/ideological persuasion and maintaining this obscure was another aspect of both creating rapport and generating rich data based on my respondents’ assumptions about it, and the adjustment of their discourse to suit those assumptions.

Age and gender are further points to be made explicit in relation to self-presentation. Many authors mention the issue of gender, and Silverman (2000), for example points out the sexism inherent in the opinion that ‘only men do serious business’ which can create an air of invisibility for female researchers to capitalise on. Feminist researchers frequently, sometimes with a hint of guilt, note...
the value of consciously playing to gender stereotypes (Conti and O’Neill, 2007) in the interview situation, particularly with male ‘elites’, and the usefulness of ‘playing naive’. In my case, being at least half the age of most of my informants, could also be employed to this end, when bringing out the persona of a ‘harmless student’ helped generate richer data.

Most of what I described does not exclusively apply to elite interviewing, and this was partly my intention in arguing the above point regarding the special treatment accorded in literature to elite interviewing. The issues of negotiating and securing access, revealing the nature of research, and the process of data generation with the relationship of power inherent in them, present themselves across the spectrum of topics and respondents and in most cases do not merit separate discussion. What we are ultimately dealing with most of the time is the flow of power in a flexible relationship, which comes as a result of the micro-political exchange, the use of cultural capital, and the utilisation of various identities, both by myself as a researcher, and my respondents. Assuming that elites will always be the authoritative ones, is something that really needs to be qualified. On occasion, and especially when dealing with sensitive issues, it is necessary to appreciate the complexity and the emotional impact of the experience for the respondents (Neal and McLaughlin, 2009), instead of jumping to the image of ‘elites’ as public figures offering many-times told official tales.

To me personally, this awareness of the unevenness of the power relationship and the image of ‘elite’ respondents as potentially equally as vulnerable as any other respondents (or researchers, for that matter) increased the sense of unease and dishonesty in fostering rapport and enabling some participants to ‘open up’, only to subject their words to a ‘detached’ critical discourse analysis later. Unlike Kezar (2003) who, with an emancipating moral purpose in mind, speaks rather matter-of-factly about establishing a one-way relationship of trust with elite respondents, for the purpose of gathering data and exposing inequalities, my purpose of ‘contributing to knowledge’, and my view of respondents as co-constituting that knowledge, has not had enough emotional pull to assuage my concerns entirely. Ultimately, what I find reassuring is being able to reflect on the moments in which the balance of power was to their advantage, and to remember that they voluntarily, and readily, accepted to participate, for a number of possible reasons. When it comes to the ‘elite’ informants’ motives in being studied, Ball (1994) is among authors who recognise that there are a variety of reasons for which members of elites agree to participate, which are used to colour their representation of the examined events and the construction of their own and others’ roles in the events. They can be embittered, disappointed, accusing, celebratory, self-justifying, defensive, etc. My experience has recorded an instance
or more of all of these. Ozga (2011) also reflects on various agendas of the ‘powerful’ and notes how she and her colleague were often conscious of being seen as a platform for spreading the former’s ideas and narratives further into the academic community. Closely related to this is also the question of the ‘elites’ wanting to advertise their participation publicly and wishing their words be attributed. With regards to the anonymity issues discussed earlier, and especially in public policy research, my solution was to offer my respondents the option of their words being attributed to them, as long as this does not impinge on the right and preference of other respondents to remain anonymous.

Finally, when speaking of power, it is necessary to note that this issue does not disappear – if anything, it becomes perhaps even more acute – once we move beyond the fieldwork situation, and into analysis - for every act of classification and naming, even in quantitative research, is one of power (Cambridge, 2007). It is an attempt to subsume lives and personalities under concepts and categories for purposes often not shared with our participants. Scheglov’s (1997) take on this is to, rather than impose categories, pay closer attention to the frames of reference adopted and used by our respondents, however, this does not solve the problem of their further interpretation and abstraction, which, unless it is done in full collaboration with respondents, still requires us to apply our frames and concepts, dictated by what we imagine the purpose of the project to be.

Conclusion

One point where both the advocates of ‘science for science’s sake’, such as Hammersley, and ‘science for political ends’, such as Kezar, agree, is that not everyone has the same moral standards, and that what I previously called situational relativism seems to be generally acceptable in, and applicable to, most individual cases where some sort of a trade-off between ethical norms and research results is expected.

Perhaps the most sensible way to approach ethical issues is to acknowledge a degree of relativism and act on a case-to-case basis. The path that we choose as social researchers will be affected by numerous factors, including the relative values, purpose and significance of research, benefit versus risk to us and our various affiliations, including those to our participants. The important thing that will make the process feel less covert and dishonest is to remain reflective throughout, and make the choices and rationalities in our actions as transparent as possible. This, however, should not remain only on the level of what Ball (1994) calls ‘trivial obsession with behaviour and events in the field’. Although this sort of
reflection is important in keeping track of the development of our project and accounting for various decisions we have made along the way, it becomes rather indulgent and superfluous if it is not theoretically and methodologically justified. It is thus necessary to acknowledge that perhaps the greatest ethical implication to consider - beyond the very rare personal harm we could induce - is that we are creating ‘knowledge’ about others, perpetuating a discourse, drawing conclusions which can, despite our disclaimers, be taken with some authority and further used in ways unbeknownst to us. It is this responsibility that separates us from mere tellers of tales, and commands a level of active self-analysis, or what is in Bourdieuan social theory ‘the objectification of the objectifying subject.’

References


Konstrukcija i moć: 
Etika proučavanja obrazovnih politika

Apstrakt: Zapadnjačka naučna zajednica poslednjih nekoliko decenija demonstrira izrazitu brigu za najviši mogući standard „etičnosti“ (Hammersley, 2010) istraživanja u okviru društvenih – između ostalog i obrazovnih – nauka. Tačno značenje ove reči je predmet debate, kao što je i pitanje da li preterano insistiranje na pravilima i propisima koji se tiču etike, zapravo ograničava kvalitet i slobodu naučničkog stvaralaštva. U ovom članku, osvrnuću se na najbitnije argumente u ovoj tekućoj raspravi, s posebnim naglaskom na pitanja etike i odnosa moći u proučavanju elita, što je tačka koja je često zapostavljena u ovakvim diskusijama. U zaključku ću pomenuti sopstveno zapažanje da, kakva god nečija pozicija u debati bila, ono što je potrebno da bi se, kako debata, tako i kvalitet istraživanja unapredili, jeste veća usmerenost na teorijske i metodološke podoge te pozicije.

Ključne reči: etika, refleksivnost, elitni intervju, moć.